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FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR THE INTERIOR OF SPAIN, 
PRESIDENT-IN-OFFICE OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Spain, which has held the Presidency of  the Council of  the European Union since 1 January this 
year, is giving priority treatment to the enlargement of  the European Union to include the candidate 
countries, which is the cornerstone of  European integration. 
The building of  a common area of  freedom, security and justice and the creation of  the Schengen 
area occupy a prominent place in the process of  consolidating and strengthening the Union and 
raising the profile of  its institutions, not only internally in relation to the citizens of  Europe, but also 
externally, in relation to the candidate countries, enabling them to acquaint themselves with the 
legal and institutional framework which constitutes the acquis in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). 
In the same effort to clarify and highlight the requirements which the candidate countries will be 
called upon to meet on accession, we are presenting to them today, at this Joint Council meeting, 
this "Catalogue of  recommendations for the correct application of the Schengen acquis and best 
practices". 
The Catalogue has been drawn up by the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation, at the initiative of 
Belgium and with the assistance of  experts of  various nationalities who have pooled their 
knowledge so as to achieve a result which can be pronounced highly commendable.  At present the 
Catalogue refers exclusively to border control and expulsion and readmission procedures, without 
prejudice to the work which successive Presidencies carry out in other fields such as visas, 
SIS/SIRENE, police cooperation, etc. 
The purpose of  the Catalogue is explanatory and it has no legally binding status.  It shows, set out in 
separate columns, on the one hand, the levels which may be required in order to comply with the 
acquis and, on the other, the best practices already being recorded in some of  the Member States, 
although, however desirable, they are not mandatory at present. 
It is with great satisfaction that the Council of  the European Union presents this working tool, 
which is intended to dispel the uncertainties to which introduction of  the Schengen acquis gives rise 
in practice.  The Spanish Presidency is confident that the Catalogue will constitute an additional 
instrument for ensuring the successful integration of  the Union's new members in due time and in 
the appropriate manner. 
Mariano Rajoy Brey 
Brussels, 28 February 2002 
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5 SCHENGEN CATALOGUE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.  At its meeting on 28 May 2001, the Council set as an objective for further work by the 
Working Party on Schengen Evaluation the identification of"  ... best practices, particularly as 
regards border controls, so that they can serve as examples for those States acceding to 
Schengen but also those fully applying the Schengen acquis.  These evaluations and the 
identification of  best practices shall serve as inspiration for the establishment of  standards 
defining the minimum application ofthe Schengen acquis (e.g. essential equipment at each 
border post) in the relevant working groups" (mandate for the Working Party on Schengen 
Evaluation) (8881/01- SCH-EV  AL 17, COMIX 371). 
On the basis of  this mandate, the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation worked out the 
principles and procedure for drawing up the Catalogue of  recommendations for the correct 
application of  the Schengen acquis and best practices, hereinafter referred to as the Catalogue 
of  recommendations and best practices, or Catalogue. 
The purpose of  the Catalogue is to clarify and detail the Schengen acquis and to indicate 
recommendations and best practices, in order to provide an example for those States acceding 
to Schengen and also those fully applying the Schengen acquis.  With this in mind the 
Catalogue gives a good indication to the candidate countries for accession to the European 
Union (hereinafter referred to as the "EU") (at their request) as to what is expected of  them, 
particularly in practical terms, regarding Schengen.  The aim is not to give an exhaustive 
definition of  the whole of  the Schengen acquis but to put forward recommendations and best 
practices in the light of  the experience gained by the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation 
in verifying the correct application of  the Schengen acquis in Germany and in evaluating 
Greece and the Nordic countries. 
The text of  the Catalogue does not seek to introduce new requirements but should also make it 
possible to draw the Council's attention to the need where appropriate to amend certain 
provisions of  the Schengen acquis so that the Commission and, where appropriate, the 
Member States take the recommendations and best practices into account when putting 
forward proposals or formal initiatives.  This exercise is inter alia the first stage of  the process 
of  defining minimum standards by the Council. 
7 Moreover, the Catalogue will serve as a reference tool for future evaluations undertaken in the 
candidate countries.  It will therefore also serve as an indicator for these countries of  the tasks 
which they will be assigned and in this respect should be read in conjunction with the 
Common Manual. 
2.  The Working Party on Schengen Evaluation adopted the following definitions to conduct this 
exercise: 
recommendations: non-exhaustive series of  measures which should make it possible to 
establish a basis for the correct application of  the Schengen acquis and for monitoring it. 
best practices: non-exhaustive set of  working methods or model measures which must be 
considered as the optimal application of  the Schengen acquis, it being understood that several 
best practices are possible for each specific part of  Schengen cooperation. 
3.  Where the Catalogue mentions the Member States which apply the Schengen acquis, this is 
currently to be taken as meaning the thirteen Member States of  the EU referred to in Article 1 
of  the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of  the EU annexed to the 
Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(hereinafter the "Schengen Protocol"), to which must be added Iceland and Norway, pursuant 
to the Agreement concluded by the Council of  the European Union, the Republic of  Iceland 
and the Kingdom of  Norway concerning the latters' association with the implementation, 
application and development ofthe Schengen acquis, signed on 18 May 1999 (these 15 States 
are hereinafter referred to as the "Schengen States"). 
The United Kingdom and Ireland expressed the wish to participate in certain provisions of  the 
Schengen acquis.  The Council has not yet adopted a decision on Ireland's request to 
participate.  The arrangements for the United Kingdom's participation were adopted in the 
Council Decision of  29 May 2000 (2000/365/EC).  The Council has not yet decided on the 
implementation of  the provisions in question. 
The Schengen acquis and the other measures taken by the institutions within the scope of  the 
acquis are, under Article 8 of  the Schengen Protocol, regarded as an acquis which must be 
accepted in full by all States candidates for accession. 
4.  The Schengen acquis was integrated into the EU framework by the Schengen Protocol.  The 
extent of  the acquis is defined in Council Decision 1999/435/EC, published in OJ L 176 of 
10 July 1999. 
8 Since its integration into the EU, the Schengen acquis has undergone developments and 
amendments which lend it an evolutionary character. 
The Schengen acquis has also taken on board the results of  the evaluations which have been 
conducted within the framework of  the Standing Committee for the application and evaluation 
of  the Schengen acquis, now called the "Working Party on Schengen Evaluation".  Under the 
Working Party's mandate, reports are submitted to the Council to establish whether the 
conditions required for the entry into force of  the provisions of  the Schengen acquis in a 
country wishing to participate in those provisions (or in some of  them) have been met and, 
secondly, to monitor the correct application of  the Schengen acquis by the Schengen States, in 
particular by detecting problems and proposing solutions. 
5.  The current Catalogue deals primarily with the issues of  borders and removal.  Free 
movement as introduced within the territory of  the Schengen States (this term and the 
expression "Schengen States" refer to the territory of  the Schengen States in which the 
Schengen acquis applies) is a freedom which as a counterpart requires the strengthening of  the 
external borders of  that area and a policy for the removal of  illegally resident aliens which is 
effective and dissuasive.  The fight against illegal immigration is a major preoccupation for 
the whole of  the EU.  It is indeed this double axiom which guides EU action in this sphere. 
Accordingly, the measures adopted in this context seek to strengthen European integration 
and in particular to enable the EU to become more rapidly an area of  freedom, security and 
justice. 
6.  The Catalogue refers to ideas or concepts connected with the administration of  borders, the 
terms of  which are not uniformly defined or codified in the Schengen States.  In the interests 
of  ease of  understanding, the following definitions apply to the terms used: 
a.  Integrated Border Security Model: name of  the system covering all aspects of  border 
policy.  This system is spread over four complementary tiers (filters) which are: 
activities in third countries, countries of  origin and transit, bilateral and international 
cooperation, measures at the external borders and further activities inside the territory. 
9 b.  Border Management: this concept covers both the surveillance of  borders and checks, 
the latter being defined in Article 6 of  the Schengen Convention: 
Border checks: checks carried out at authorised crossing points.  It should be 
noted that checks on persons shall include not only the verification of  travel 
documents and the other conditions governing entry, residence, work and exit but 
also checks to detect and prevent threats to the national security and public policy 
of  the Schengen States.  Such checks shall also be carried out on vehicles and 
objects in the possession of  persons crossing the border. 
Border surveillance: surveillance carried out between authorised crossing points. 
7.  In the Catalogue the reader will find the following sections: the Catalogue currently comprises 
two main chapters, one on borders and the other on removal.  A general section describes the 
basic concepts underlying the policy and is followed by recommendations and best practices 
presented in tabular form, with recommendations on the left and best practices on the right, 
alongside the relevant recommendations.  Where one of  these recommendations applies only 
to one or two types of  border this is mentioned in the text. 
*  *  * 
10 PART ONE: BORDERS, BORDER SURVEILLANCE AND BORDER CONTROL 
A.  INTEGRATED BORDER SECURITY  MODEL (A MECHANISM OF DIFFERENT 
TIERS/FILTERS) 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
An overall border model is an important tool to safeguard internal security and in particular 
prevent illegal immigration.  It means in simplified terms that a set of  complementary 
measures has to be implemented on different tiers.  In this respect four tiers can be identified. 
(1)  Activities in third countries, especially in countries of  origin and transit, including the 
collection of  information by liaison officers as well as the key role of  the consular post 
abroad in the process of issuing visas. 
(2)  International border cooperation. 
(3)  Measures at external borders: border management (border checks and border 
surveillance). 
(4)  Further activities inside the territory of  the Schengen States and between Schengen 
States. 
The coherence between these measures and the way they are applied by Schengen States is a 
key to the success of  the general border model. 
11 2.  THE FOUR TIERS 
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2.1.  Activities in third countries, in countries of  origin and transit 
(a)  The first measure required in terms of  time and place is advice from liaison 
officers and document experts in third countries of  origin or transit which are the 
source of  the risks generated by illegal immigration (Article 47 (4) of  the 1990 
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (hereafter the "Schengen 
Convention") and SCH/Com-ex (98) 59 rev).  Officials working abroad for the 
Schengen States' consular posts and carriers will be trained by specialists in order 
to detect document forgeries before actual travel has started. 
When visas are issued and when passengers are transported by air and sea, it is of 
great importance to detect false and falsified documents in order to prevent 
unauthorised entry into the territory of  the Schengen States.  The training given by 
document advisers makes a vital contribution to the detection of  such forgeries by 
officials working for the Schengen States' consular posts and for carriers. 
(b)  In the second stage, a thorough inspection of  the application documents submitted 
should be carried out by the Schengen States' consular representations when 
issuing visas (see Articles 15 and 17 of  the Schengen Convention and the 
provisions of  the Common Consular Instructions on Visas).  This includes 
inspecting documents and making database queries pursuant to Article 96 of  the 
Schengen Convention.  Consulates  should guarantee that sensitive information 
and blank documents are adequately protected and stored. 
The systematic implementation ofEC/Schengen visa regulations should enable 
the phenomenon of  illegal immigration to be effectively tackled at its roots.  The 
importance of  intensive consular cooperation should be stressed in that context. (c)  Carriers are also obliged pursuant to national legislation on the basis of 
Article 26(1)(b) of  the Schengen Convention to take all necessary measures to 
ensure that third-country nationals carried by air, sea or land, (see Article 26(3) of 
the Schengen Convention), have the travel documents necessary for entry into the 
territory of  the  Schengen States.  If  third-country nationals are set down in a 
Schengen State without the prescribed documents, the carriers will be subject to 
sanctions and compelled in principle to take back those passengers.  Staff of 
carriers should be trained.  This article of  the Schengen Convention has been 
supplemented by Directive 2001/51/EC of28 June 2001-L 187, 10.7.2001, 
p.  45. 
2.2.  Bilateral and international border Cooperation 
(a)  International co-operation in the field ofborder security can be divided into 
multilateral, bilateral and local cooperation. In this respect, agreements with 
neighbouring countries on the cooperation in the field of  border management are 
an efficient tool to increase border security. This can be realised by establishing 
appropriate working mechanisms such as exchange of  information, establishing 
appropriate communication channels, local contact points, emergency procedures, 
handling incidents in an objective manner in order to avoid political disputes, etc. 
Regional cooperation structures across external borders should also be established 
in sea areas.  These initiatives should bring together all countries in the region. 
(b)  As regards cooperation with adjacent states, it is considered necessary that transit 
states lend their active assistance by ensuring that their borders are thoroughly 
secure and by taking measures away from the border, i.e.  consistent repatriation 
practice - if  there is no right of  admission and there are no impediments based on 
serious humanitarian grounds or international law (e.g. the Geneva Convention 
relating to the Status of  Refugees, European Convention on Human Rights). 
13 14 
2.3.  Measures at the external borders 
The core area of  general border strategy is a functioning border management consisting 
of  border checks and border surveillance, based on a risk analysis.  Article 6 of  the 
Schengen Convention sets out clearly the framework to be implemented by the 
Common Manual, the two being complementary.  Essential elements of  border 
management are:  (1) that all persons crossing the external borders are checked 
systematically and (2) effective border surveillance is ensured between border crossing 
points. 
In this respect all appropriate measures should be taken in order to safeguard internal 
security and prevent illegal immigration: 
Coherent legislation based on the EC/Schengen requirements in the area of  border 
management is needed (for example: border guard act, data protection rules).  With 
regard to infrastructure, appropriate facilities for carrying out border checks and 
surveillance have to be available.  Officials carrying these tasks have to be professional 
and specially trained.  Adequate human resources are required.  Exact requirements 
depend on several factors (geographical situation, volume of  border traffic, etc.). 
Moreover, a clear concept of  training (basic and further) is required covering 
operational skills, knowledge of  legislation, languages, etc. 
Equipment should be appropriate to the border situation.  Functioning internal 
coordination is needed at all levels (which authorities are competent for which task, no 
competence "black holes").  Information exchange between competent authorities 
(border guard, customs, police, judicial authorities, prosecutors) is essential, including a 
mechanism to solve possible disputes of  competence between the authorities. 
Furthermore, operational issues should be covered (for example use of  compatible 
communication equipment). Agreed international/bilateral cooperation should be implemented in practice on the 
spot (examples: exchange of  information, joint controls, handling of  readmission 
situations).  The special requirements for the three different types of border (air, 
sea, land) should be fulfilled (for example: at airports a separation of  passenger flows -
extra Schengen and intra Schengen flights- should be made by physical means or, for 
minor airports, by a systematically monitored and accompanied flow of  passengers). 
2.4.  Further activities inside the territory of  the  Schengen States 
(a)  Measures to prevent illegal immigration and cross-border crime should be pursued 
inside the territory of  the Schengen States by enhanced search, checks and 
surveillance measures based on national information and in accordance with 
national law, where possible on the basis of  police cooperation agreements 
pursuant to Article 39(4) and (5) of  the Schengen Convention.  Given that the 
problems of  migration and crime are not subject to geographical restrictions, 
international traffic routes should in future become main areas of  activity for 
national police forces in accordance with domestic law.  However, where public 
policy or national security so require, a Schengen State may, after consulting the 
other Schengen States, decide that for a limited period national border checks 
appropriate to the situation shall be carried out at internal borders. 
(b)  The last stage in the geographical and time sequence is repatriation in accordance 
with national law (see Article 23 of  the Schengen Convention and Directive 
2001/40/EC of28 May 2001  - L 149, 2.6.2001, p.  34) of  third-country nationals 
who have entered the Schengen territory without authorisation, if  no right to stay 
exists and if  there are no obstacles based on compelling humanitarian grounds or 
international law (e.g. the Geneva Convention on Refugees, European Convention 
on Human Rights). 
15 3.  KEY ELEl\.fENTS FOR THE CORRECI' APPLICATION OF THE INTEGRATED BORDER SECURITY 
MODEL 
16 
Emphasis should be placed on the coordination of  duties between the responsible government 
bodies in dealing with information, reports and training and in responding to irregularities. 
Coordination in these fields should extend to regional and local levels too. 
Another key element of  the method is to pay attention to the assessment of  the situation. 
Thus, the performance of  a border management system should be adjusted in accordance with 
the prevailing conditions along all its borders.  Valid and reliable data should form part of  a 
permanent evaluation which could be shared by other Schengen States.  Where necessary, the 
allocation of  resources should be adapted accordingly. 
As a general rule, persons performing border police duties should be specialised trained 
professionals.  Persons with less experience can be used only for auxiliary duties assisting 
professionals temporarily.  No exception is allowed in respect of  duties that require any use of 
personal data, making searches in confidential registers or decisions interfering with an 
individual•s physical integrity or freedom. 
To facilitate mutual trust, any Schengen State should be able to provide valid and reliable data 
concerning the situation at all its borders and also the border checks and surveillance 
measures applied.  Knowledge of  the situation at the border relies on knowledge of  the 
performance of  border management systems.  Reliable estimates concerning border checks 
and surveillance measures should be based, among other things, on complete knowledge of 
regional and local circumstances.  To attain the above aims and to facilitate cost-effective use 
of  resources, various methodologies should be applied at the borders.  Terms such as risk 
analysis, intelligence, data-flow management, situational awareness, reaction capability and 
information exchange with other  Schengen States can be used when evaluating and 
developing these methods. Risk analysis can be seen as a tool for optimisation of  border management and a way of 
providing reliable information on the border situation.  It should be adapted to the type of 
borders. 
At practical level this means evaluation of  the persons, vehicles, vessels or flights to be 
checked.  This evaluation is made in the context of  a real time tactical situation and thus the 
methods can be called tactical risk analysis.  At the external border, all persons should be 
checked according to the Common Manual.  To detect cross-border crime, extra emphasis 
should be placed on the checking procedure for suspect objects.  Personnel should be 
provided with knowledge of  risk indicators, risk profiles and typical modi operandi of 
cross-border crime.  Named special targets of surveillance and checks should also be known 
to personnel.  The risk analysis and management of  borders need to be backed by systematic 
intelligence.  Border management systems should be able to gather intelligence, analyse it 
and, finally, utilise the products in field work. 
To have a realistic picture of  prevailing irregularities for the purposes of medium and 
long-term operative management, estimates should be made of: 
•  the level of  risk defined by the authorities in respect of  illegal crossing of  the border 
•  the level of  detected irregularities 
•  the level of  estimated undetected irregularities. 
This is to ensure that resources will be allocated optimally along the border in order to 
maintain a reasonable risk level in respect of  illegal crossing of  the border.  Further, at all 
managerial levels, the management system should be evaluated in order to find out 
shortcomings or gaps in the system.  These exist where a border can predictably be crossed 
illegally with very low risk or no risk at all. 
17 B.  DETAILS OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND BEST PRACTICES 
RECOMMENDATIONS/BEST PRACTICES 
Recommendations  Best practices 
1  Strategy and organisational structure 
1.1 general strategy for border 
management + risk assessment 
- establishing a national plan defining the 
steps to be taken in the countries of 
origin and transit, at external Schengen 
borders and inside the individual 
Schengen States 
- border management is a task which 
requires a high level of  professionalism 
- streamlined and functional ministerial 
competences for border management. 
Centralised supervision and instructions 
for border checks and surveillance 
under the auspices of  a ministry  - the competent public authority is a 
working in the field of  justice and home  specialised Police/Border Guard force 
affairs.  (not a military force) 
- effective border management is ensured  - border checks and surveillance should be 
by supplementing strategy with  executed by professional officials of  the 
technology, equipment and staff;  same administration organising border 
mobile and stationary, airborne or on  management if  possible under a single 
land/sea, uniformed or plain clothed.  national ministry. 
18 Recommendations  Best practices 
- permanent analysis determines the 
allocation of  personnel and technical 
resources; 
- an evaluation is to be made to ensure 
that border management matches the 
requirements of  Article 6 of  the 
Schengen Convention and to consider 
whether border management has to be 
adapted.  Article 7 requires exchange of 
all relevant information. 
- at international level border 
management should be governed by 
bilateral agreements 
- cooperation and coordination of  the 
These agreements/  Acts should cover the 
responsibilities of  the different bodies 
whole spectrum of  cross-border cooperation, 
should be regulated by an official Act 
i.e. joint risk analysis, exchange of 
experience, cooperation on training, 
cooperation on investigation 
1.2 Intelligence and data-flow 
management 
- a two-way information exchange  A secure database is established to exchanoe  0 
should be arranged between central and  experience between units and to distribute 
local levels of  the border management  information on intelligence objects.  This 
authority.  database is available for use in border 
management. 
- the local authorities should be 
instructed to gather information on  For specified analysis and exchange of 
illegal immigration and other cross- information, a network of  intelligence liaison 
border irregularities, analyse it locally,  officers is established to connect different 
and pass it on to central level.  units and different organisational levels. 
19 Recommendations  Best practices 
- the central level should compile all 
information country-wide, process it 
into usable form and deliver it to local 
authorities to be used as a tool for 
tactical risk analysis and operational 
planning. 
- data-flow management can be used as a  Information in the intelligence database is 
means of  evaluating the effectiveness of  hidden, until a specific inquiry is made.  The 
information exchange within and  right to make searches is controlled by a 
between authorities involved in border  supervisory unit. 
management.  Availability of  and 
access to vital data and data protection 
are also elements to be evaluated. 
1. 3 regional or local strategy 
- where appropriate, establish regional 
plans based on risk assessment 
intensive cooperation between all law 
enforcement agencies in the national 
border region 
- cooperation with law enforcement 
agencies of  neighbouring states 
- reception of  information from the  - creating access points for information 
population should be encouraged and  from and to the public (Internet, etc.) 
transformed into risk analysis and 
operational activities if  necessary 
20 Recommendations  Best practices 
1. 4 organisational (functional) structure 
- coordination of  all activities at central,  - creating a local and regional 
regional and local levels  coordination mechanism or organisation 
- establishing capabilities to fight  - establishing specialised 
successfully against illegal crossing of  officers/teams/units to fight illegal 
the border  crossing of  the border crime at different 
levels if  needed 
- the organisation should provide highly 
specialised services required for border  - the organisational structure provides for 
checks/surveillance- for example on  a specialised officer for false and 
false documents  falsified documents and one with the 
necessary linguistic skills to be available 
on every shift or at every border crossing 
- specify a lapse of  time within which the  point (hereafter "BCP") 
squad should reach the border in the 
event of  an alarm 
1.5 availability and  permanency 
- depending on the situation, ensure 
availability and  permanency of  staff 
1. 6 Situational awareness and reaction 
capability 
In green and blue border management, terms  At land borders, the border is subject to 
of situational awareness and reaction  constant monitoring (human or technical 
capability can be used to define the level of  devices).  Where this is not feasible, 
risk to be confronted with illegal border  specialised sniffer dogs may extend 
crosstngs.  surveillance time.  The dogs should not be 
Situational awareness measures how the  aggressive or uncontrolled when meeting 
21 Recommendations 
authorities are capable of  detecting 
cross-border movements and finding 
reasoned grounds for control measures. 
In practice, situational awareness depicts how 
the authorities define the lapse of  time and 
area for three functions: 
- detecting movements that could 
possibly be attempts to cross the border 
illegally 
- identifying the detected targets 
Best practices 
illegal border crossers. 
At sea a VT~S  (or compatible) system 
covers the entire maritime area and ports 
under evaluation.  All vessels are detected 
and identified by the system.  Once 
identified, a vessel remains constantly known 
by the system.  The system is backed up by 
- analysing the previous identifications in  offshore craft and airplanes.  These mobile 
due time  units make close identification, fill in gaps 
and retrieve information from outside the 
system.  At ports, based on a risk analysis, 
the port area may be fenced off  and 
monitored constantly.  In such cases all 
persons entering or leaving the port area are 
checked. 
The reaction capability at sea or land 
measures the lapse of  time required to reach 
any cross-border movement to be controlled 
and also the time and the means to react 
adequately to unusual circumstances.  The 
latter also applies also to the situation at 
airports. 
22 
- deploy stand-by squads 
At sea, constant readiness to dispatch a 
mobile unit, in order to maintain any vessel 
trying to reach the coast under constant 
surveillance. Recommendations  Best practices 
2  Infrastructure 
2.1 entrance and exit checks 
- facilities should be in place to carry out 
the compulsory entrance and exit 
checks. 
- at land borders, entering and exiting 
cross-border traffic of  all kinds should 
be separated. This applies also to sea 
borders between the vessel and the 
border checks. 
2. 2 organisation of  border surveillance 
- border surveillance can be carried out 
by human resources (supported by 
technical means) or mainly by highly 
sophisticated man-operated techniques. 
To ensure efficiency, the means are 
adapted to the density of  population, 
number of  personnel, equipment and 
migration risk. 
- deployment and spread of  infrastructure 
facilities (buildings, etc.) adapted to 
mobility, number of  staff, regional 
traffic infrastructure and migration risk 
23 Recommendations  Best practices 
2. 3 organisation of  the border crossing 
point 
- exchange of  information with the  - building BCP installations with the 
neighbouring country on building a  neighbouring country in a coordinated 
BCP, aiming at a certain degree of  way to achieve adequacy of  means 
coordination (land)  (dimensions, lanes, installations) (land) 
- constructing border crossing points, 
using common experience among 
Schengen States, depending on regional  - signposts to provide information for 
conditions, in perhaps two versions, one  users in different languages (depending 
large model and another a small BCP.  on type ofBCP and neighbouring 
Travellers should be made familiar with  country) or by internationally used 
similar procedures  drawings (pictograms) 
- the delimitation of  the BCP and the  - a fence around the BCP (land) 
applicable regulations should be readily 
visible to all 
- border checks to be carried out in 
special control booths or at desks or,  - these installations to be provided to all 
where appropriate, with mobile  relevant national services/authorities 
equipment. 
- inside buildings special dedicated desks 
or booths shall be provided for the 
different tasks and be built accordingly 
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Outside buildings, control booths 
containing the necessary equipment 
- unauthorised observation (especially of 
computer systems) should be prevented  - control booth from which officers can 
oversee the queue of  passengers waiting 
- to define standardised criteria for the 
manufacture of  control booths (having 
regard to security; technical equipment) 
- control booth should be facing the 
passengers (air, sea) 
- communication  I 
a suitable communication system 
should provide instant information on 
each important situation at any time for 
all units 
2. 4 separation of  passenger flows 
Structure 
Separation at ports 
Ferry passengers to be separated so that 
external border traffic can never mix with 
internal traffic between the vessel and the 
border check.  As a general rule, this must be 
guaranteed by means of  physical fixtures 
(walls, fences, etc.).  In minor ports with only 
a limited amount of  passengers, constructions 
can be supplemented by surveillance. 
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Separation at airports 
Airports should be (re-)arranged in order to  Separate terminals for Schengen and 
avoid the possibility of  persons or documents,  non-Schengen traffic 
passing from the non-Schengen zone to the  Separate and dedicated levels for Schengen 
Schengen-zone and vice-versa by physical  and non-Schengen traffic 
separation.  Watertightness may be obtained by walls, 
glass, metal grid, ... , reaching from the floor 
to the ceiling 
- checks at the gate for high-risk flights 
Aerodromes where the volume of  traffic  I 
allows to do so may separate flows by 
organising systematically monitored and 
accompanied flow of  passengers. 
Procedures 
Identify Schengen and non-Schengen flights 
Cooperate as closely as possible with third  Monitor the flights according! y through a real 
parties at airports, with special attention to  time system, agreed upon with the civil 
connecting flights  aviation authority 
Provide the necessary information in due time  Plan buses for transporting passengers from 
for the border management authorities.  remote parking areas to the dedicated area of 
Establish a link with the flight aviation  the airport. 
information system 
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2. 5 lanes for checks 
Separation between (a) EU and EEA  - separate lanes for checks on EEA 
nationals and (b) non-EU/non-EEA nationals  nationals, for third-country residents and, 
(airports and sea)  depending on the situation, a third lane 
for citizens of  the neighbouring country 
Number and capacity of  lanes should fulfil  can be provided in order to facilitate 
the need for fluid and quick but  traffic.  Where possible adapt the 
Schengen-compliant checks and surveillance  situation to the required checks on EEA 
and non-EEA nationals. 
- hand-in-hand management oftraffic 
flows by all competent authorities of  Lanes must be marked clearly for use of 
both neighbouring States.  travellers (private cars, pedestrians, lorries, 
buses, CD/CC if  necessary. Markings may be 
- flexible organisation of  lanes for checks  adapted to needs in a flexible way. 
and securing a quick and effective 
reaction.  Separate lanes for the 
different types of  traffic crossing the 
border 
- organisation of  border checks with 
priority on entry into the State 
3  Staff 
3.1 Adequacy 
- effective border checks and surveillance  - study comparable situations in other 
require that the number of  staff must be  Schengen States which could serve as an 
adapted to risk assessment, based on  example 
analysis 
3. 2 selection criteria for recruiting new 
staff 
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- written rules for recruiting new staff 
- physical suitability 
- meet moral and legal requirements 
(criminal (judicial, legal) records, etc.) 
3. 3 professionalism 
- high level of  professionalism based on 
successfully completed training.  (The 
requirements for this topic are 
presented under "Training", see 1.4) 
- provide for regular evaluation in which 
e.g. job satisfaction, effectiveness, 
I 
social conditions and liability are 
measured  - provision for rotation of  staff. This is 
considered most useful at the beginning of 
the career for reasons of  effectiveness 
4  Training 
4.1 basic training 
Operational staff should have successfully 
completed a training course covering their 
future tasks, which should include: 
- knowledge of  relevant Schengen and 
EC/EU provisions 
- basic rules and procedures  - programmes should adapt flexibly to risk 
- document checks (valid, falsified  assessment 
documents) 
- rules for entry, stay and exit 
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- coordination and cooperation with other 
agencies 
- special cooperation between  Schengen 
States in the internal border zone 
(Dublin, readmission, etc.) 
- police cooperation 
- Schengen Information System 
- judicial cooperation 
4. 2 further continuing education 
- a training programme must be  The organisation should provide programmes 
established with a regular training/briefing  and facilities at central and local level to 
hours for officers as part of  working hours  accompany officers during their career by  I 
offering them education and training on 
! 
issues which are relevant to their work 
4. 3 linguistic training 
- ability to speak a foreign language  encourage staff to learn other languages 
useful for their work  necessary for their work, languages of  the 
neighbouring countries or the countries of 
.. 
ongtn 
4. 4 specialised technical training 
counterfeits and  forgeries 
- specialised training in recognising false  Specialist officers should train officers at all 
travel documents  BCPs 
4. 5 Specialised training  for management  - international experience of  a similar 
levels  responsibility is an asset 
- participation in the CEPOL training 
programme will in future be advisable 
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5  Equipment 
5.1 Recommended equipment 
5.1.1. Introduction 
The following paragraphs will mention 
equipment which is deemed necessary and 
should be permanently optimised in the first 
line and additional requirements in the second 
line, in trains as well as mobile equipment.  It 
should be stressed that SIS connection and 
stamps are considered to be key equipment 
5.1.2. In the first line: 
Upon entry and exit at the BCPs access to the 
following equipment should be provided: 
- terminal for consulting SIS and national 
systems.  There will be mobile 
terminals at ground checks on 
passengers in vehicles in sea ports with 
ferry traffic and in airports with limited 
traffic; otherwise fixed terminals. 
- document examination instrument, with 
UV light, white overhead light, 
transmitted light, etc. 
- magnifying glass x 8/1 0 
30 
retro-reflective lamp 
stamps.  Pursuant to the Common 
Manual, Schengen entry and exit 
stamps will be provided to all BCPs. 
Information on lost or stolen stamps 
must be given as quickly as possible to 
Best practices 
Car numberplate imaging system 
- truck scanning facility 
-radioactivity sensors 
-mobile/stationary X-ray machine 
Number of  stamps should be listed for the 
different officers Recommendations  Best practices 
Schengen States 
5.1.3.  For in-depth checks in the 
second line 
Questioned Document Examination System 
for authentication of  travel documents with 
infrared and ultraviolet light, filters, etc.  - image transmitting device 
- stereo magnifying glass, for example 
x40 
- identification equipment and material 
(including template to compare stamps) 
- Common Manual  - availability by electronic means of  the 
I 
- handbook containing genuine and false  Common Manual 
passports and ID documents 
- availability by electronic means of 
communications equipment  images of  genuine, false/falsified 
documents 
- availability of  sets and telephones to 
communicate during border checks to 
consulates or other authorities in the 
Schengen States 
5.1.4. Mobile equipment 
Mobile equipment should be used at border 
crossing points where there are no fixed 
positions.  The mobile equipment should 
contain: 
- hand-lamp with UV light 
- mini-microscope x 30 
- magnifying glass x 8/10 
- retro-reflective lamp (3M  .laminate) 
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- hand-lamp for overhead light, 
transmitted light (Mini Maglite or 
similar) 
- template to compare stamps, etc. 
- stable access to SIS should be provided  - mobile SIS terminal 
- mobile document readable device 
5. 2 Border surveillance 
Observation and detection material which 
provides adequate surveillance of  terrain in  A highly centralised technical surveillance 
all seasons and weather conditions (day and  system that detects and identifies (camera) 
night)  the target and enables immediate reaction 
(patrol).  The system is based on sensor fields 
I 
that consist of  different types of  sensors 
(stable and portable) such as active and 
passive IR-beams, radars, cameras, seismic 
sensors, etc.  The sensor fields and/  or 
individual sensors are installed in accordance 
with the existing local situation.  The system 
itself is controlled centrally with or by a 
computer in the OP centre that is capable of 
commanding and controlling active patrols 
and requesting reinforcements when 
necessary. 
thermographic cameras (portable, stationary 
and/or vehicle-based) 
binoculars, short and long-range versions 
depending on the local situation, compatible 
devices based on radio transmission, 
telephone system and/or data connection are 
advisable with the neighbouring country 
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5. 3 Transportation/Mobility 
Providing transportation depending on local 
infrastructure, regional conditions (weather, 
topographic situation, density of  population) 
manpower and migration flows 
Transportation services should be available 
day and night 
5. 4 Communication and encryption 
Make provision for procedures for secured 
communications between services  I 
i 
6  Internal coordination 




- direct and immediate interchange of  - meeting between heads of  services, at all 
information between BCPs and border  levels especially at international airports, 
surveillance force  regular meetings between heads of 
services, including airport authorities 
and civil aviation authorities 
- joint database 
- joint risk analysis 
- joint training 
- integrated approach involving all 
authorities for tackling the problems of 
illegal immigration 
agree on a decision-taking mechanism 
at the appropriate level 
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common operations with joint 
leadership 
7  Different kinds of international 
cooperation 
According to the type of  borders (land, sea, 
air) international cooperation can be shaped 
through bilateral or multilateral agreements, 
regional cooperation, liaison officers and 
networks as well as transportation authorities. 
These agreements should preferably be 
concluded in a written form. 
7.1.1  At international level, 
! 
border management should be regulated 
in bilateral agreements (land borders) 
7.1.2  information exchange with 
other Schengen States on maritime 
borders (sea) 
7.1.3  information exchange with 
the immigration authorities at the 
airport of  origin/transfer  - Document advisors/Liaison officers to 
detect false or falsified documents in the 
consulate or airports of  origin and transit (  cfr. 
SCH/Com-ex (98) 59 rev) 
Participation in the IAT  A Control Authority 
Working Group 
Build up a working group of  specialised 
immigration officers at the main international 
airports for tackling illegal immigration by 
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a1r. 
In order to allow a better cooperation and a 
better  exchange of  information between the 
Border Guard services and the air travel 
companies, as well the services that have to 
ensure the security of  the air space it is 
advisable that Airport Border Guard Units 
participate in the ECF  ALIS  system 
(European Civil Aviation Conference 
Facilitation Information System on Illegal 
Immigration). In this context, it must be 
stressed that all information with police 
interest should be diffused to friendly 
agencies after sensitive or classified items 
I 
have been erased. 
7. 2 Regional cooperation 
support the neighbouring border 
authority through exchanging 
information and transmitting facts of 
interest to it. 
7. 3 Liaison Officers 
establishment of  a liaison office for the  - cooperation between liaison officers 
exchange of  information 
on the basis of  conventions or national  Nordic cooperation between liaison officers 
law  could serve as an example for a future 
network. 
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8  Rules and procedures 
8.1 General aspects 
It should be stated that entry and exit checks 
are to be performed systematically. 
Exceptions to border checks are possible only 
under special circumstances (this applies only 
at sea and land borders) 
National legislation to allow the relevant 
authorities for border checks and surveillance 
the legal possibility of  patrolling, surveying 
and investigating border-related crime, 
without limiting it to the close border area 
8. 2 Rules  for minor border traffic 
Bilateral agreements are the basis of  minor 
border traffic between neighbouring 
countries; in any event, information should be 
communicated to other Schengen States. 
8. 3 Rules  for issuing visas at the border 
(B and C visas) 
Visas should in principle be issued at 
consulates.  Only in exceptional 
circumstances may they be issued at BCPs. 
Best practices 
Use ofEISICS is seen as a meaningful 
practice. 
•  decision to be made by a senior officer 
or official of  a higher authority 
There should be a general manual valid for all  In addition to the compulsory use of SIS and 
BCPs describing the steps to be carried out  the national database, recourse should be had 
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for a visa to be issued at the BCP.  to information from other services 
all available national and  Schengen State 
information should be used to make a proper 
decision 
the decision and the major reasons underlying 
it should be placed on file 
necessary contacts and participation 
involving other Schengen States to be carried 
through in a standardised way 
8. 4 Seamen in transit 
The rules applicable for seamen in transit are 
described in Schengen Com-ex decision 
(96) 27 
Operational aspects of  fighting 
cross-border crime 
The operational dimension in fighting 
cross-border crime is important in border 
management. 
It  is therefore important to have legislation  set up specialised multidisciplinary units for 
which affords all relevant authorities  fighting border-related crime 
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(Border Guard, police, customs, judiciary, 
etc.) the legal possibility of  preventing and 
detecting border related crime, without 
limiting it to the close border area. 
Schengen States should describe the 
framework they have adopted to fight 
cross-border crime, which: 
- should be based on an analysis of  the 
different types of  crime and 
- should include an overview of  all relevant 
factors, such as personnel, equipment and 
training as well as cooperation between 
national and international services 
9  Particular cases for certain types of 
border 
9.1 Maritime borders 
9 .1. 1  Risk analysis 
The volume of  vessel movement is usually 
high in relation to the resources available for 
checks.  Tactical risk analysis is therefore 
essential at blue border surveillance to meet 
the demands set out under the Common 
Manual Part II, point 2.2.  Vessel movements 
should be monitored and vessels identified. 
Identifications (names ofvessels) should be 
checked against background information 
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Best practices 
VTMIS or similar system is used to cover 
large maritime areas, where all major traffic 
remains as identified targets.  The authority 
responsible for maritime border police duties 
has real-time access to VTMIS. For details, it 
is referred to the best practice described under 
1.1.6. ''Situational awareness and reaction 
capability" Recommendations 
containing knowledge on risky vessels.  The 
level of  checks on each particular vessel 
should be decided according to this reference. 
The same procedure should be applied to 
crew and passenger lists. 
The command with operative responsibility 
for a defined area should maintain reasonable 
risk levels against known or possibly 
prevailing irregularities.  This should take 
place in all areas and on all flows of  traffic. 
To this end, the performance of  border 
management authorities' duties should be 
adjusted in accordance with fresh knowledge 
of  risk factors.  This basically concerns 
medium-term planning in the operational 
command.  Medium-term methods of 
evaluating the situation and adjusting 
countermeasures can be called operative risk 
analysis. 
The operational command should have a 
realistic picture of  prevailing irregularities in 
the area of  responsibility.  To that end, 
figures or estimates should be arrived at for 
the following: 
•  type and volume of  all vessel movements 
between the open sea and coast 
•  volume of  actual checks directed at 
different types of  vessel movement 
•  (based on above) the level of  risk of  being 
caught illegally crossing a border 
Best practices 
Formalise where possible cooperation with 
•  volume and type of  detected irregularities  carriers in Memoranda of  Understanding or in 
Agreements 
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•  volume and type of  estimated undetected 
irregularities. 
Cooperation with third parties 
Cooperation with all type of  carriers should 
be strengthened 
9.1.2  Cargo ships 
Best practices 
100% administrative checks should be carried  Participation in the EISICS system 
out in advance.  Based on these checks and 
available intelligence, a risk analysis should 
be made.  High-risk vessels to be checked 
physically, immediately upon arrival. 
Control duties consisting of  face-to-face 
checks of  persons on board and/or physical 
search of  ship. 
If  information concerning the crew and 
passengers is not available in advance, the 
ship should be physically met immediately 
upon arrival. 
Passengers should always be checked face to 
face. 
In cases of  special risk, vessel to remain 
under constant control of  authorities during 
its stay in a Schengen port.  All persons 
boarding and leaving the ship to be checked 
face to face.  Information on high-risk vessels 
to be relayed to the ship's next Schengen port 
of  destination through the CIREFI 
early-warning system. 
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9.1.3  Cruise ships 
In principle, the Schengen acquis requires a 
face-to-face check to be made for all 
passengers on board cruise ships at first and 
last port of  entry.  As a general rule, the 
passenger must meet all necessary entry or 
exit preconditions.  However, the regulations 
concerning special circumstances will 
warrant a lower level of  checks if: 
•  there is a very large number of  passengers 
on board, 
•  only limited time is available for checks, 
and  I 
•  there are good grounds for believing the 
vessel with its passengers to be low-risk. 
Under these conditions, administrative checks 
only in the first and last Schengen port are 
acceptable.  This requires, at the very least, 
that an SIS query is made on third-country 
nationals and their passports stamped. 
If  the check shows on-board persons to be 
refused entry to the Schengen territory, 
special measures are necessary and in the 
mutual interests of Schengen States and 
shipping companies.  The authorities should 
ensure that the person remains on board and 
leaves the port on the vessel.  Information on 
such persons should be relayed to the next 
Schengen port of  destination of  the ship, 
where a similar procedure will apply. 
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If  a cruise ship is a risk in terms of  illegal 
crossing of  the external border, special 
measures are necessary and in the mutual 
interests of  Schengen States.  Such a vessel 
should remain under constant control by the 
authorities during its stay in a Schengen port. 
All persons boarding and leaving the ship 
should be checked face to face.  In order to 
embark or disembark, each passenger should 
meet all necessary preconditions of  entry or 
exit.  Information on such ships should be 
relayed to the next Schengen port of 
destination of  the ship, through the CIREFI 
early warning system. In the next port, a 
I 
similar procedure will apply. 
The lighter checks described above should in 
no way prevent authorities from carrying out 
more thorough checks anywhere in 
subsequent ports. 
Cruise passengers should hold a visa 
complying with the same rules as other 
persons when entering the Schengen territory. 
9.1.4  Fishing vessels 
Monitoring should be carried out to ensure  Exchange of  information is arranged between 
that fishing vessels coming from third  Schengen States and neighbouring third 
countries follow the correct procedure.  states.  The third state reports inter alia 
vessels that are leaving its territory and, 
The Schengen acquis allows administrative  especially, boats that have avoided exit 
checks on crew members, if  they can be  checks when leaving Schengen territory. 
regarded as seamen.  Nevertheless, recourse 
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should be had to face-to-face checks and/  or 
physical search of  the vessel whenever 
deemed necessary by risk analysis. 
In addition, coastal fisheries mentioned in the 
Common Manual, Part II, point 3.4.4.4 
should be checked occasionally in accordance 
with proper risk analysis. 
9.1.5  Pleasure boats 
Monitoring should be carried out to ensure  Exchange of  information is arranged between 
that pleasure boats coming from third  Schengen States and neighbouring third 
countries follow the correct procedure.  states.  The third state reports inter alia boats 
I 
that are leaving its territory and, especially,  I 
boats that have avoided exit checks when 
leaving the Schengen territory. 
9.1.6  Ships with a large number of 
illegal immigrants on board 
Emergency plans should be set in place to  A government body is nominated for inter-
handle ships with a large number of  illegal  ministerial and inter  -agency coordination. 
immigrants on board, covering the following  This body possesses the necessary parallel 
aspects:  representative sub-bodies at regional and 
•  apprehending the persons responsible for  local levels to facilitate coordination and the 
illegal transportation with a view to  clear division of  responsibilities.  Adequate 
further judicial measures  powers and resources are made available to 
•  apprehending all persons on board in  this structure and especially to those regional 
order to take responsibility for the  bodies responsible for carrying out physical 
immigrants with a view to repatriation  measures. 
and in order to guarantee their health and 
This structure is held in readiness to facilitate 
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protection rights  implementation of  recommended practice. 
•  relaying information on high-risk vessels 
to other Schengen States by EISICS and  Local and regional authorities maintain 
the CIREFI early warning system  consistent plans for their participation and 
cooperation.  These plans are regularly tested 
and developed as instructed by the 
government coordinating body. 
9.1.7  Stowaways 
In order to combat the phenomenon of 
stowaways, authorities should adopt 
preventive measures against unauthorised 
boarding/leaving of  ships. 
9.1.8  Fake crews 
In order to combat fake crews as a means of 
illegal entry, authorities should carry out 
intelligence operations, exchanges of 
information, investigative measures and 
prosecution. 
9.1.9  Seamen's identity document 
When issuing seamen's identity documents,  The security features of  the document are as 
close attention should be paid to the security  for national passports. 
features of  the document. 
9  .1.1 0  Transiting seamen 
Under the acquis, the captain or the 
shipowner's agent should inform the 
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inform the border management authorities as Recommendations  Best practices 
authorities in charge of  border management at  soon as possible and always at least three 
the port of  entry of  the arrival of  seamen in  days prior to the arrival of  the seamen, in 
need of  a transit visa and any other changes in  order to expedite procedures for issuing 
crew composition.  transit visas. 
The border management authorities should  A unit on duty 24 hours a day will be set up 
check the accuracy of  the data provided by  to give swift, coordinated answers to requests 
the captain or the shipowner's agent.  for transit visas for seamen made at the 
border. 
The authorities can issue transit visas to 
seamen only after careful verification of  the 
data provided by the shipowner and 
confirmation by the authorities of  the place 
where the ship is moored or is expected to 
moor. 
9.1.11  EISICS 
Vessels and their crew and passengers should  All Schengen States should join the EISICS 
be thoroughly checked in the first port of  system, which should be computerised, in 
arrival in the Schengen territory.  If  the  order to ensure that information is protected 
vessel's next stop will also be in a port of  a  and sent on quickly to the relevant border 
Schengen State using the EISICS system,  management authority. 
then the border management authority of  the 
first Schengen State should, when the vessel 
is leaving that state, fax the EISICS form to 
the next port.  The EISICS form should list 
all the relevant information gathered by the 
border management authority on the vessel. 
The border checks in the next port can be less 
thorough, based on the information received 
in the EISICS form. 
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Electronic data interchange 
Schengen States should encourage the use of 
electronic data interchange (ED  I) at their 
maritime borders.  Electronic data, inter alia 
to identify crew members, passengers, 
stowaways - as well as their travel 
documents - on board a vessel, transferred in 
good time, should act as a binding substitute 
for all paper documents in use at the border of 
a Schengen State. 
Use of  ED  I should be facilitated by 
harmonising and standardising legislation on 
binding force or consequences.  Border 
I 
authorities of  the Schengen port where a 
vessel is leaving its berth should transfer the 
updated electronic data in good time to the 
authorities of  the next Schengen port of 
destination. 
9. 2 Air borders 
9.2.1  Crews 
Crews should be checked systematically  have a special facility for priority checks on 
crews 
9.2.2  Cargo flights 
Systematic check should also be applied for  officers should go to cargo flights to meet the 
crews of cargo flights  staff 
9.2.3  Procedure for transit passengers 
(airport) 
A separate transit area for non-Schengen  Possibility to perform checks in the 
passengers should be available  (international) transit zone 
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9.2.4  General aviation 
----------- -----------
9. 3 Checking of  trains 
Trains should be under proper and continuous  Trains should be under continuous 
surveillance from border to border check  surveillance from border to border check 
point.  Actual border checks may be carried  point (e.g. patrols, technical surveillance, 
out on the moving train, or at the railway  video). 
station either on board the train or in the fixed  Platform area for external traffic trains to be 
premises used specifically for those purposes.  physically separated from internal traffic 
Border management authorities should have  ones.  Possibilities of  avoiding border checks  I 
effective tools to check travel documents and  should be prevented and arrival area should 
consult online databases at their disposal in  be under proper control. 
all cases.  All passengers and crew (and train)  Pre-frontier checks together with border 
should be checked according to Schengen  authorities of  neighbouring third countries 
rules (Art. 6 of  the Schengen Convention).  may be effective, if  the relevant jurisdictional 
requirements are met and reciprocal trust 
exists between (a) neighbouring countries 
and (b) between the Schengen partners. 
Agree on cooperation with train carriers. 
This cooperation should, where appropriate, 
be formalised by providing a list of 
passengers to border authorities in good time 
beforehand. 
mobile SIS equipment on trains (checks 
before crossing the border and on hotspots) 
47 PART TWO: REMOVAL AND READMISSION 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The fight against illegal immigration is a major concern for all the Member States of  the Union. 
Freedom of  movement within the Schengen territory requires a corresponding reinforcement of  the 
external borders around that territory, and an effective and dissuasive policy on the removal of 
illegal aliens. 
Article 23(1) of  the Schengen Convention states that third-country nationals (ie non-EU and 
non-EEA nationals) who do not fulfil or who no longer fulfil the short-stay conditions applicable 
within the territory of  a Schengen State shall normally be required to leave the territories of  the 
Schengen States immediately.  When departure is not voluntary, or if  the immediate departure of 
the third-country national is necessary for reasons of  national security or public order, removal is to 
be carried out in accordance with the national law of  the Schengen State in which he was 
apprehended. 
Thus, while the Schengen Convention clearly states the need for removal, the Schengen acquis on 
the subject is very limited as the Schengen States are free to define the circumstances and 
implementation of  such measures. 
Some harmonisation of  legislation  has taken place in the context ofDirective 2001/40/EC, cited 
above, on the mutual recognition of  decisions on the expulsion of  third-country nationals, the aim of 
which is to ensure more effective enforcement of  these measures and better cooperation between 
Member States. 
The method used to draw up the document was firstly to establish a snapshot of  existing national 
practices and then to choose from this range those practices which seemed to be moving in the 
direction of  greater effectiveness. The list thus drawn up is indicative and non-exhaustive. 
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2.  REMOVAL l\1EASURES 
These should comply with the rule of  law and  Effective removal from the territory. 
be based on law.  To achieve this, combine the measure, if 
appropriate, with a ban on the third-country 
These should be adopted in compliance with  national returning to the territory for a 
the provisions laid down in:  sufficiently long period and incorporated into 
the SIS in order to be dissuasive. 
- the European Convention on Human  Failure to comply with a ban on returning to 
Rights of  4 November 1950,  the territory could incur sanctions. 
the United Nations Convention against  I 
- ! 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 
December 1984, 
- the Geneva Convention relating to the 
Status ofRefugees of28 July 1951  and the 
Protocol of  31 January 1967, 
- the International Convention on the Rights 
of  the Child of20 November 1989, 
- the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the 
European Union of 13-14 October 2000. 
- Objective: To achieve the return of  the 
third-country national subject to the 
measure to his country of  origin or to a 
country which will admit him. 
49 Two types of  decision: 
Administrative based on: 
the failure to comply with rules on entry or 
residence of  third-country nationals, 
a threat to public order or national security. 
Administrative or judicial sanction 
in connection with criminal offences of  a 
certain level of  seriousness. 
Guarantees granted 
Possibility for the detained third-country 
national to appeal against the measures 
imposed on him. 
3.  PERSONSCONCERNED 
3.1.  Dlegal third-country nationals 
Allow the third-country national to exercise 
the rights granted to him. 
If  the third-country national does not comply  In this case the decision requesting him to 
with this decision, he should be removed.  leave the territory may be followed up with a 
check on departure from the territory. 
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If  the third-country national does not comply 
with the requirement to leave the territory, he 
should be placed on both the national and, if 
appropriate, SIS wanted persons lists. 
To ensure the credibility of  the system, 
deliberate resistance to removal may be 
subject to specific sanctions, which will obviously not affect the initial removal order, 
which should be enforced. 
3.2.  Third-country nationals whose 
presence constitutes a threat to public 
order or national security 
(1-2): Particular case of unaccompanied 
minors 
The following recommendations or best practices are only applicable to the extent that 
they are allowed by the national legislation of each Schengen State. 
- The removal of  unaccompanied minors  - The removal of  unaccompanied minors as  I 
while ensuring the best interests of  the child  soon as possible while preserving the interests 
and respect for the provisions of  the  of  the child.  As far as possible ensure that 
International Convention on the Rights of  the  minors are accompanied and taken charge of 
Child of20 November 1989.  upon arrival. 
4.  IMPLEMENTATION OF REMOVAL 
MEASURES 
4.1.  Identification 
- Identification, particularly by the finger- Establishment of  a national third-country 
printing of  third-country nationals subject to a  nationals file. 
removal measure. 
- Inclusion in a data file of  third-country 
nationals who apply for a visa or 
residence permit.  To be implemented 
in the future. (Conclusions of  JHA 
Council on 20 September 2001). 
51 - For the purposes of  non-admission, 
complete the record by indicating grounds. 
4.2.  Detention 
Third-country nationals who constitute a 
threat to public order or national security must 
be detained during the period preceding 
implementation of  the removal order. 
This is necessary when the person cannot be 
removed rapidly, in particular because he 
does not possess a travel document. 
Detention may be used to prevent the 
third-country national avoiding a measure for 
his removal and to prepare for implementation 
of  the measure. 
-Need for specific premises 
Third-country nationals subject to a removal 
order must in principle be held in special 
centres with a proper legal status 
distinguishing them very clearly from prison 
institutions, equipped with facilities which 
guarantee accommodation and hygiene 
conditions respecting human dignity.  The 
facilities should also allow those detained 
there to exercise their rights (interpreters, 
visits, health care, etc.). 
- Guarantees 
Possibility for the detained third-country 
national to appeal against the measures 
imposed on him. 
52 -Minors 
They can be detained only in specific cases  It would be appropriate to provide for 
and in compliance with the International  alternatives to detention for minors. 
Convention on the Rights of  the Child of 
20 November 1989. 
-Duration 
The duration of  the period of  detention of  This objective justifies an appropriate period 
third-country nationals is a decisive factor in  of  detention. 
the removal measure, the aim being to allow 
the service responsible for removal the time 
strictly necessary for practical organisation of 
the departure. 
4.3.  Issue of consular laissez-passers 
Laissez-passers obtained from consular  Use all appropriate means, including consular 
authorities within time limits compatible with  authorities visiting detention centres. 
the periods of  detention. 
To this end, strengthen consular cooperation 
4.4.  Financing removals 
Examination of  the possibility of  the costs of  Examination of  the possibility of  the costs of 
removal being borne by:  removal being borne by: 
- the third-country national himself; 
-the facilitators. 
- the third-country national himself; 
- the person who provided accommodation for 
the third-country national or by whoever 
sponsored the third-country national in a 
sponsorship declaration when the 
third-country national was issued with a visa 
or residence permit; 
-the person employing the third-country 
53 4.5.  Escort 
Where necessary, escorts are provided by 
officials specially trained for the task. 
The removing State should conduct a risk 
assessment of  the person being removed to 
determine whether the use of  escort is 
required, and if so, the number of  escorts 
necessary. 
The carrier involved in the actual execution of 
the removal should be informed about the 
results of  the risk assessment in accordance 
with the Chicago Convention of 
7 December 1944 and the standards and 
recommendations adopted by ICAO. 
- Readmission 
Readmission agreements generally provide 
for two categories of  persons who may be 
readmitted: the country's own nationals, and 
nationals of  third countries.  There may also 




Possibility of  charging the removal and 
detention costs to the abovementioned people. 
- Possibility of sanctions if  they do not pay. 
The introduction of  special European charters 
could contribute to improving the removal 
arrangements. 
Develop cross-border cooperation between all 
of  the competent authorities concerned. Readmission makes the Member States and 
the third States responsible for controlling 
their borders efficiently. 
This special procedure consists of  removing 
illegal third-country nationals in State A to 
State B which is their State of  origin and/or 
transit, and of  requiring the latter to receive 
them. 
Readmission takes place at particular points 
determined in each agreement.  It is 
indispensable that the authorities of  the 
readmitting State should be physically 
capable of  accepting returnees as soon as the 
decision of  acceptance is taken. 
Introduce effective readmission policies using 
all means available whether in legal 
instruments (readmission agreements, 
introduction of  readmission clauses into other 
kinds of  agreement, etc.) or in practical terms. 
Response to the readmission request as soon 
as possible. 
55 The purpose of the  Catalogu~ is  to  clarify and detail the Schengen acquis,  to provide an 
example for those States acceding to Schengen and also those fully applying to the Schengen 
acquis. With this in mind the Catalogue gives a good indication to the candidate countries 
for accession to the European Union as to what is expected of  them, particularly in practical 
terms, regarding Schengen. 